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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
VERNON B. ROMNEY, Attorney General of
the State of Utah,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
HA VEN J. BARLOW, OMAR B. BUNNELL,
E RN E ST H. DEAN, RICHARD V.
EV ANS, KENDRICK HARWARD, MERRILL JENKINS, D I X IE LEA VITT,
CHARLES WELCH, JR., RALPH C. ANDERSON, STANFORD P. DARGER.,
FRANKLIN W. GUNNELL, ROYAL P.
HARWARD, J. DEAN HILL, MRS. C. L.
JACK, DELLA L. LOVERIDGE, and
MILDRED OBERHANSLEY, individually
and as members of the 37th Utah State
Lezislature comprising the Utah
Council,
Defendants-Respondents.

r

Case No.
11912

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE

This case challenges the constitutionality ot
Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1967, which provided for
a per diem payment of $25.00 per day plus expenses
to members of the Legislative Council.

2
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment, finding the paymei:l
constitutional.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's
decision and asks for a determination of unconstitutionality in this matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The 37th Legislature for the State of Utah
amended Section 36-4-12, Utah Code Annotated
(1953) to read as follows:
"Members of the Council and the chairman and vice chairman and members of any
subcommittee appointed by the Council thereto
shall be paid a per diem of $25.00 per day and
be reimbursed for actual expenses incurred
while attending said session."

Subsequent to this enactment, the appellant in
his official capacity as Attorney General of Utah
brought this action contending that this enactment
was in violation of the Utah Constitution, Article
VI, Sections 7 and 9.
The lower court found no standing for the
appellant but the Utah Supreme Court reversed.
Hansen v. Barlow, ........ Utah 2d..... ___ , 456 P.2d 177 (1969).

3
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SENATE BILL 183 (CHAPTER 71, LAWS OF UTAH
1967) INSOFAR AS IT PURPORTED TO AMEND
UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-4-12 (1953), IS VOID AS BEING IN CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION
7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

At the time Senate Bill 183 was passed by the
37th Legislature, Section 7 of Article VI of the Utah
Constitution read as follows:
"No member of the Legislature, during the
term for which he was elected, shall be appointed or elected to any civil office of profit under
this State, which shall have been created, or
the emoluments of which shall have been increased, during the term for which he was
elected."

Senate Bill 183 amended Utah Code Ann. §
36-4-12 (1953) to read as follows:
"Members of the council and the chairman
and vice-chairman and members of any subcommittee appointed by the council thereto
shall be paid a per diem ot $25 per day and be
reimbursed for actual expenses incurred while
attending said session." Utah Code Ann. § 364-12 (1967 Amendment).

A. A LEGISLA TOR, APPOINTED TO THE
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OR A SUBCOMMITTEE

4
THEREOF IS APPOINTED TO A "CIVIL OFFICE OF
PROFIT."
To be a "public office 0£ a civil nature" thert
are five elements which seem to be indispensable:
0) The office must be created by the legislature or
state constitution; (2) it must possess a delegation
of a portion of the sovereign power of government
to be exercised for the benefit of the public; (3) the
powers and duties must be defined by the legisla·
ture; (4) the duties must be performed independent·
ly and without control, unless otherwise specified
by the legislature; and (5) it must have some perma·
nency and continuity. State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkin;.
79 Mont. 506, 257 P. 411 (1927).
The Utah legislative council is created by, and
its members derive their powers from, a legislative
act. The term of service is fixed and because of its
composition, it has permanency and continuity. The
legislative council works wrlhout any supervision
and control. Among its duties and powers are the
following: (1) It should collect information, examine
previously enacted statutes and recommend amend·
ments thereto; (2) it prepares a legislative program;
(3) it investigates state and local government; (4) it
cooperates with other state government depart·
ments; (5) it should perform the duties of the inter·
state cooperation commission; and (6) it can employ
professionals to aid its studies. The members of the
legislative council are therefore seen to be either
appointed, or elected, to a "civil office of profit."
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It should be pointed out that when the act
establishing the council was first passed some of
the members were not legislators. Even today the
statutes provide that members of .subcommittees
need not be legislators. By statute then, there is
somewhat of a parallel between the civil members
,:-i:.1d ihe duly elected legislators of the council. This
distinguishes our case from State v. Yelle, 185 P.2d 723
(\fl/ash. 1947).
B. THE EMOLUMENTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL \!VERE INCREASED BY THE LEGISLATORS APPOINTED TO THE COUNCIL.
A dictionary definition of emulument is "profit
from office, employment or labor." Websters New
International Dictionary, 2nd Edition.
Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 183 by the
37th Legislature (1967), Section 36-4-12 read as follows:
"Members of the council and the chairman
and vice-chairman and members of any subcommittee appointed by the council thereto
shall be reimbursed for actual expenses incurred while attending said session."

The new statute gave the council members and the
subcommittee members their actual expenses plus
$25.00 per day while attending the council meetings. This was not an "across-the-board" salary increase to all members of the legislature.

It is elementary then, to question whether or
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not the emoluments of the office of council merr.bers
has been increased. They most certainly have been.
POINT II
SENATE BILL 183 CONTRAVENES SECTION 9
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AS CONSTITUTING
AN INCREASE IN COMPENSATION BEYOND THE
MAXIMUM AM 0 UN T CONSTITUTIONALLY A1
LOWED.

At the time Senate Bill 183 was passed by the
37th Legislature, Section 9 of Article VI of the Con·
stitution read as follows:
"The members of the legislature shall receive such compensation, not exceeding $500.00
a year for the legislative term and $5.00 a day
expenses while actually in session, and mileage
as provided by law."

This section limits the legislators to $500.00 a
year while actually in session. Senate Bill 183 would
have allowed the legislators to earn $500.00 each
month by merely attending 20 legislative council
meetings per month. The constitutional limitation of
$500.00 per year contemplated 60 days in session
each two years. If, as the other side argUes, the
duties of the legislative council members are mere·
ly restatements of the duties of all legislators, then
the constitutional limitation of $500.00 should not be
expanded and enlarged for a certain elite body of
said legislators.
In view of the "legislative history" one can
easily see that the amount of $500.00 was meant to
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be a limitation. The Laws of 1961, S.J.R. No. 3, proposed increasing the compensation of legislators
to $1,200.00 a year and their expense allowance to
$10.00 a day. The voters rejected this proposal.
The laws of 1966 (Second Special Session),
S.J.R. No. 4, indicated that the legislators proposed
to increase their compensation to $1,000 a year and
to provide themselves with expenses and mileage
"as provided by law" both for attending sessions
and for attending meetings between sessions. Again
the voter approval was not forthcoming.
Impatient with the democratic processes for
amending the Constitution of Utah and increasing
their compensation, defendants and their compatriots attempted through Senate Bill 183 to provide by statute for the very "expenses and mileage
for attending meetings between session" which the
voters refused to allow them in 1966.
Great weight is placed on the fact that from
statehood until 1950 there was a constitutional pro
hibition against members of the legislature receiving "other pay or perquisite." The opinion by the
lower court suggests that when this phrase was left
off, the voters impliedly approved of giving some
legislators additional pay when they attend the
council meetings. The lower court missed an
portant point.
As originally drafted, Section 9 of Article VI of
the Utah Constitution provided. as follows:
"The members of the Legislature shall
receive such per diem and mileage as the Leg-

8
islature may provide, not exceeding four dollars
per day, and ten cents per mile for the distance
necessarily traveled going to and returning
from the place of meeting on the most usual
route, and they shall receive no other pay or
perquisite."

Note that the legislature was given the right to
provide for their per diem salary up to $4.00 per day.
Nothing beyond this was allowed. The phrase "and
they shall receive no other pay or perquisite" adds
nothing to that limitation.
Section 9 was amended in the general election
of 1944. The amended section, which became effective on January 1, 1945, then read as follows:
"The members of the Legislature shall receive such compensation and milaege as the
Legislature may provide, not exceeding $300.00
per year, and ten cents per mile for the distance necessarily traveled going to and returning from the place of meeting on the most usual
route, and they shall receive no other pay or
perquisite."

Once again the legislature was given the right
to provide for its compensation, only this time up
to $300.00 per year. Again the phrase " ... and they
shall receive no other pay or perquisite" adds nothing to the initial limitation.
The constitution was then amended in 1950, ef·
fective January 1, 1951, and this amendment was in
effect when Senate Bill 183 was passed by the legislature in 1967. Once again that section is cited and
the reader is asked to note that here the limitation
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is set out point blank-the legislature is not given
an opportunity to set their own salary as they previously could:
"The members of the legislature shall receive such compensation, not exceeding $500.00
a year for the legislative term and $5.00 a day
expenses while actually in session, and mileage
as provided by law." Constitution of Utah,
Article VI, Section 9.

The limitation is therefore more obvious than in the
previous sections which included the phrase "and
they shall receive no other pay or perquisite."
Our contention then is that the amendment
which dropped that phrase merely dropped surplusage.
POINT III
THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE
DOES NOT AFFECT THE INSTANT SUIT.

Today, Section 9 of Art. VI of the Constitution
of Utah states:
"The members of the Legislature shall receive compensation of $25 per diem while actually in session, and mileage as provided by
law."

This amended language should not affect the
case at bar. This case was originally filed on May
9, 1967, by the then Attorney General of the State
of Utah, Phil L. Hansen. If the court finds that Senate
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Bill 183, insofar as it purported to amend Section
36-4-12 of the Utah Code, was unconstitutional a!
the time it was to become effective on May 9, 1967,
then it would be null and void ab mitio and the
later constitutional amendment of Section 9 of Arti·
cle VI would not resurrect Senate Bill 183 into valid
legislation.
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that it
will call an unconstitutional statute void ab initio
and any attempt to call it otherwise is "abortive and
unrealistic." Placing a constitutional change before
the electorate has never validated unconstitutional
legislation. Foulger Equipment Company v. State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 165, 397 P.2d 298 (1964).
Therefore, this action is continuous and the
present language in the Utah Constitution in no
way affects this litigation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons heretofore given, the appellant
respectfully requests that the Court find Senate Bill
183 unconstitutional.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Appellant

